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Why Do Pensions Reduce Mobility?
ABSTRACT
Previous studies have found that workers who are covered by pensions are
much less likely than other workers to leave their jobs, but the evidence on
how specific pension characteristics affect turnover is inconclusive. This
paper examines how mobility is affected by vesting standards, the compensation
level, and the capital loss of pension wealth for job changers. In two
different data sets, we find that the capital loss is strongly associated with
lower turnover rates, whereas vesting and the compensation level have
relatively little impact. Large capital losses are mainly associated with
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Raleigh, NC 27695-8110Academics and practitioners in the industrial relations field have long
known that workers who are covered by defined benefit pension plans are less
likely to leave their employer than those who are not covered. Most
discussions have attributed this to vesting provisions, which prevent workers
from collecting a pension if they leave the firm before meeting certain age and
years of service criteria. Previous econometric studies of the relationship
between pensions and mobility have found much lower mobility among workers
covered by pensions, but the evidence on the role of vesting is inconclusive.1
In addition previous studies have not allowed for the possibility that even
among vested workers, defined benefit pension formulas penalize job changing.
In this paper we estimate a proportional hazards model over two different data
sets to determine how vesting and benefit formulas affect mobility among
workers covered by pensions.
Pension characteristics and mobility
A person who leaves a job before becoming vested will not receive any
pension benefits from that employer upon retirement. This creates an obvious
incentive to stay on the job until vesting.
Pension benefits for most persons covered by defined benefit plans are
determined by formulas which pay a percentage of final earnings for each year
of service. As long as earnings rise over time, the use of final earnings (or
the average of earnings In the final years with the employer) in the formula
penalizes those who leave the firm, even if they are fully vested.
To see this, consider a worker who earns $40,000 after 20 years in the
labor market and $80,000 after 40 years. Assume that all employers pay an
1Mitchell (1982) examines the overall effect of pensions on mobility;
Schi].].er and Weiss (1979) and Wolf and Levy (1984) focus on the impact of
vesting provisions.2
annual pension equal to 1.5 percent of final earnings for each year of service
with that firm when one reaches age 65. If a worker stays with a single
employer throughout this period, the pension will be $48,000 (.015 x 40
x $80,000). Suppose instead that this person leaves his employer afterthe
20th year and moves to another firm with an identical pension plan. Assuming
lifetime earnings remain the same, the total pension payments received from
both employers amount to only $36,000, of which $12,000 (.015 x 20 x $40,000)
comes from the first job and $24,000 comes from the second job
(.015 x 20 x $80,000). Anticipating this loss of pension benefits, workers
become much less likely to move to another job when they are covered by
pensions with this type of benefit formula.
These explanations of the impact of vesting and benefit formulas on mobility
highlight the key forces at work in the relationship between pensions and
mobility, but they are misleadingly simple because they ignore the question of
how much earnings have been reduced to pay for the worker's pension. Suppose
that after 20 years the worker has paid for a pension benefit of $24,000 upon
retirement (half of the ultimate $48,000 benefit he would get if he stayed for
40 years), but is legally entitled to a benefit of only $12,000 if he leaves
after 20 years. In this situation the worker faces a capital loss of pension
benefits if a job change occurs. On the other hand, if after 20 years with the
firm the earnings reductions are just large enough to fund a benefit upon
retirement of $12,000, then the worker has nothing to lose by moving to
another firm.2
21f the worker had stayed at his original job, then the remaining $36,000
of annual pension benefits would have been paid for during the last 20 years
with the firm under this assumption.The key issue is whether the pension is part of a series of short term
(e.g., one year) labor contracts or part of a lifetime contract with a bonding
mechanism to penalize mobility. In the former case, which is discussed in
Bulow (1982), a worker pays only for the benefits to which he is legally
entitled, namely those based on his earnings of $40,000 (which would be his
final earnings with the firm if he left after 20 years). In the latter case,
which is analyzed in Ippolito (1985, 1987), the worker pays for benefits
based on expected final salary ($80,000), but stands to collect a benefit
based only on his current salary if he leaves the firm before the end of the
contract. The difference between these two benefits represents a capital loss
to the worker if he leaves his employer before retirement, which should
discourage voluntary quits.
In addition, large capital losses could be associated with lower layoff
rates. Lazear (1979) has argued that firms can increase productivity by
adopting payment schemes which pay workers less than the value of their output
at the beginning of the employment relationship and more than the value of
their output toward the end. This scheme is part of a long term contract
between the worker and the firm, under which the firm promises the worker a
long term job as long as the worker's performance is adequate. Those with
inadequate performance forfeit the option to receive the delayed payments,
which would include a capital loss of pension wealth. Although firms have an
incentive to fire workers and collect a capital gain on their pensions,
concern about labor market reputation and the ability to write similar
productivity-enhancing contracts in the future can prevent this from
happening. As a result, layoff rates could also be inversely related to the
size of the capital loss.
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The impact of vesting rules on mobility also hinges on the nature of the
pension contract. Under the strict legal interpretation, firms do not owe
workers any pension benefits until they are vested. If the pension is part of
a short term labor contract, then workers will not pay for pension benefits
until vesting and vesting per se should have no effect on the incentives for
mobility. If unvested workers have lifetime contracts under which their
salaries are reduced to pay for possible future benefits, then the guarantee of
benefits at vesting will reduce the capital loss by a modest amount and make
turnover more likely immediately after vesting than before.
A final possibility is that the lower turnover rates observed for workers
covered by pensions merely reflect a higher overall level of compensation.
All previous studies of the impact of pensions on mobility have included wage
rates or earnings among the exogenous variables. Holding wages constant,
workers with pensions receive more total compensation than other workers
and are less likely to quit. The overall impact of pay levels on mobility is
ambiguous, however, because layoff probabilities could very well be higher for
more highly paid workers.
Methodolozy
We have outlined three mechanisms through which pensions can reduce
mobility: capital losses, vesting provisions, and higher pay levels,To
estimate the impact of each of' these variables on mobility, we estimate a
proportional hazards model.3 Let fi(t) be the probability that person i will
leave his employer at time t, Fj(t) be the cumulative probability that person i
3For an introductory discussion of duration analysis and the proportional
hazards model, see Allison (1984) and Kiefer (1987).5
will have left at or before time t, and 1 -Fi(t)be the probability that
person i will still be with his employer at time t. Then the hazard rate for
person i is defined as Hj(t) —fj(t)/[l
-F(t)].Increases in the hazard rate
are associated with a greater likelihood that a person will leave his
employer.
In the proportional hazards model proposed by Cox (1972), Hi(t) is specified
as the product of an arbitrary function of time H(t) which is the same for
everyone and another function containing variables Xj with unknown coefficients
.Generallythis latter function is specified as exp(Xfi), giving us
(1) H(t) —H(t)exp(Xi).
This specification has two convenient properties. First, dlnHj(t)/dXj —
meaningthatindicates the relative change in the hazard in response to a one
unit change in Xj. Second, by not specifying a functional form for H(t), there
is less concern about the sensitivity of the results to distributional
assumptions. The estimates depend on only the rank order of the times workers
are observed leaving their employers. We estimate (1) with the unsupported SAS
supplementary procedure PHGU1, written by Frank Harrell of the Duke Medical
Center.
Included among the variables in Xi are an indicator of whether or not
the worker was vested, an estimate of average hourly compensation which
includes pension compensation, and an estimate of the capital loss for each
worker if he leaves the job held at the beginning of the sample period. By
estimating (1) over a sample of workers covered by pensions, we will be able to
determine which, if any, of these three mechanisms is associated with lower
turnover.6
Data
Our estimates of (1) are obtained from the 1975-1982 Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics (PSID) and the 1971-1981 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men
(NLS). The samples are restricted to those covered by pensions. The hazard
rate estimates are based on the year in which workers leave the firm with which
they were employed at the beginning of the sample. Observations where the
worker is still at the same firm at the end of the sample period are called
right-censored, which simply means that the year in which they leave their job
is not observed in the data. Our main concern is with how pensions affect
quits and layoffs, but workers also leave their employers to retire or for
other reasons. To prevent factors associated with retirement decisions from
contaminating the results, we restrict the PSID sample to heads of household
under age 55 and treat the workers in the NLS sample who retire as
right-censored observations.
In addition to examining overall turnover rates, we also estimate separate
proportional hazard models for quits and layoffs. In the quit model, cases
where the respondent left the job for any other reason (such as a layoff or
disability) are right-censored. The same type of adjustment is made in the
layoff model as well.
The NLS and the PSID both report pension coverage, but the PSID does not
report vesting status and neither data set reports the capital loss. In our
analysis of the PSID, we assume that all workers become fully vested in their
tenth year with their employer. To estimate the impact of vesting on turnover,
we include a dummy variable equal to one if the worker was vested in 1975 and
another dummy equal to one if the worker was vested by 1980. If turnover is
greater for workers who were vested or for those who became vested during the7
sample period, this would indicate that vesting provisions are an important
factor generating lower turnover among workers covered by pensions.
The capital loss equals the difference between the pension income the
worker would receive if he stayed with his original employer and the pension
income he would receive if he left that firm and took another job with an
identical pension plan. A detailed discussion of how the capital loss was
estimated appears in Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988). Here we focus on data
sources and key assumptions.
Estimates of the pension benefit formula for each worker are derived from
the 1983 Employee benefit Survey (EBS). Plans in the EBS were sorted into
eight industry and three occupational classifications. Within each
industry-occupation cell there are as many as five different types of pension
formulas (e.g., simple earnings-based or dollar per year of service.) The
formula type which covered the largest proportion of participants within each
cell was assumed to apply to all participants in that cell. The mean parameter
values for that formula type are used as the estimate of the benefit formula
for all PSID and NLS respondents in a given industry-occupation category. For
earnings-based formulas, the key parameters are the generosity factor (percen-
tage of average earnings) and the length of the salary averaging period. Age
and service requirements for normal retirement in the EBS were assumed to be
equal to cell means, based on all plans in the cell regardless of formula
type.
Given the benefit formula, it is straightforward to calculate the capital
loss with information on age, earnings history and years of service given by
PSID and NLS respondents. The value of a life annuity was calculated beginning
at the normal retirement age but discounted to the current age. The discount8
factors used were 7 percent for the NLS and 9 percent for the PSID; these
values correspond to long term top-grade bond rates at the beginning of the
sample period. These rates were also used to make assumptions about nominal
salary growth, following Ippolito (1985).
The benefit formula estimates are also used to calculate how much additional
pension wealth legally accrues to the worker if he stays on his job an extra
year. This amount, which is called pension compensation, represents the
additional pay that workers covered by pensions receive. It is based on
years of service and, in most cases, current and past salaries. To control
for the total amount of compensation received by workers with pensions, we
include a variable equal to the sum of the wage rate (or average hourly
earnings) and average hourly pension compensation. If the lower turnover
rates observed for workers covered by pensions are mainly attributable to
higher overall levels of compensation, then this variable should be inversely
related to turnover and the vesting and capital loss variables should be
unrelated to turnover.
Other independent variables included in the proportional hazards model
include union membership, years of service and its square, age, education,
race, marital status, number of children, industry, occupation, and location.
These come directly from the NLS and PSID at the beginning of the sample
period.
Results
The coefficient estimates of the proportional hazards models in Table 1
indicate the impact of each variable on the log of the hazard rate Hj(t). In
the PSID a $1000 increase in the capital loss is associated with a 6.2 percentreduction in the hazard for turnover (6.2 —exp(-.O64)
-1).The mean capital
loss for persons covered by pensions in the PSID is $5,024. Our estimates
indicate that if this were reduced to zero, the hazard would increase by 37.9
percent. Although estimated with less precision, the results for the NLS are
very comparable. For these older workers, a $1000 increase in the capital
loss is associated with a 2.8 percent reduction in turnover. because many
older workers were not vested in 1971 and entitled to no benefits if they left
their jobs, the average capital loss in this sample is much larger ($12,922)
than in the PSID. Reducing this capital loss to zero would increase the
hazard by 45.4 percent.
The capital loss is much more strongly associated with reductions in the
layoff hazard than the quit hazard in both the NLS and PSID.In terms of the
theories outlined above, this may indicate that capital losses influence
mobility mainly through being part of an underpay-early/overpay-later
compensation scheme. Another possibility is that it is very difficult to
distinguish between quits and layoffs in questionnaires where the worker is
asked what happened to a job that was held a year ago.
The vesting variables are unrelated to turnover in the PSID. In the NLS
vested workers are much less likely to leave their jobs than unvested workers,
controlling for years of service with the 1971 employer. This is exactly the
opposite of what one would expect if vesting were the key pension
characteristic responsible for lower turnover.
Higher overall compensation levels are associated with higher hazard
rates for turnover, quits, and layoffs in the NLS. This contradictory finding
is probably attributable to either a correlation between wages and some
unobserved variable (such as mobility costs or general human capital) or the
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limited age range of the NLS sample, in which everyone was 50 to 64 in 1971.
Nonetheless, it is very difficult to use this evidence to claim that the higher
compensation level resulting from pension coverage is responsible for lower
turnover. In the PSID, the turnover hazard is unrelated to compensation
levels.
As for the key control variables included in the model, there is no
correlation between years of service at the beginning of the sample period and
mobility in either the PSID or NLS. Except for a lower quit probability for
union members in the PSID, there is no relationship between union membership
and mobility.
Implications
This paper has examined whether the lower turnover rates observed for
persons who are covered by pensions are attributable to capital losses, vesting
provisions, or compensation levels. The evidence indicates that the capital
loss is strongly associated with lower turnover rates, whereas vesting and
compensation levels have relatively little impact. Further, large capital
losses are mainly associated with lower layoff hazards rather than lower quit
hazards. Unless this is an anomaly resulting from mismeasurement of the causes
of separations, this evidence indicates either that deferred compensation
schemes increase productivity (and thus reduce layoffs) or that employers are
sufficiently concerned about labor market reputation and the ability to offer
deferred compensation schemes in the future to prevent them from laying off
workers and collecting a capital gain on their pensions.
Another important mechanism through which pensions can reduce mobility is
by influencing the type of employee which the firm is able to attract. Ifsome workers are inherently more prone to turnover than other workers, then
firms with pensions are more likely to attract those with low odds of
turnover. Because the data sets used here are restricted to workers covered
by pensions, this study has not been able to gauge the importance of this
factor. In the labor force, most turnover is concentrated among workers with
two or fewer years of service, a group for which the capital loss is quite
small and the results of this study may be of limited applicability.
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Sample size 774 774 774 764 764 764
Uncensored
observations
304 175 118 91 30 58
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Each equation also
contains age, race, schooling, marital status, number of children,
industry, occupation, and location as control variables. Sex is
also included as a control in the PSID; labor force size and local
unemployment rates are included in the NLS. The samples are
restricted to persons covered by pensions. Turnover consists of
quits, layoffs, and separations caused by other factors such as
strikes or the end of a temporary job.
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